Intel® Security Technologies

BpmGen2 User Guide

Revision 0.9

Last updated November 2, 2017

Important Changes and Updates:

Oct 2, 2016 Initial Draft

Nov 15, 2016 Added new features – KM Gen & ability to display BPM and Key manifests

Feb 21, 2017 Added Quick Start Guide

Mar 17, 2017 Updated to support legacy (v1.0) platforms (such as SKL/SKX)

May 30, 2017 Updated to support BFX (Block boot)

Oct 5, 2017 Updated for new BPM & KM Structures and added features

Note: BpmGen2 is significantly different from and not backward compatible with the original BpmGen tool.

This toolkit is provided “as is” with no express or implied warranty and thus it is the user’s responsibility to verify proper functionality.

# Introduction

## Scope

The purpose of this document is twofold:

* Describe how to use the BpmGen2 tool
* Provide the OEM (Platform Architect and BIOS Developer) with information on how to best configure the BPM and explain the impact of those settings on Intel® Boot Guard and Intel® Trusted Execution Technology.

The first time you read this document you should read (at least browse through) the entire document.

Chapter 1 “*Introduction*” is a short introduction to the tool’s capability.

Chapter 2 “*BpmGen2 Tool Fundamentals*” explains how to use the tool.

Chapter 3 “*BPM PARAMS File*” explains how to edit the BPM Parameter file and provides guidance on various settings. However some topics require more detailed discussion, thus the following chapters and Annexes.

Chapter 4 “*Understanding Your Role and Responsibilities*” provides a more detailed guide for setting required components.

Chapter 5 “*Power Down Memory Depletion*” provides a guide to using a new Intel TXT capability – Power Down Memory Depletion backup method for scrubbing memory.

Chapter 6 “Boot from Block” explains how to produce a BPM for booting from a block media device.

Chapter 7 “OBB Hash” explains how the BpmGen2 tool can calculate OBB Hash measurements

Appendix A “*BpmGen2GUI Tool*” provides an introduction to the BpmGen2GUI tool.

Appendix B “*Recommendations*” provides recommendations and tutorials on using the tools.

## Overview

Intel© has converged Intel Trusted Execution Technology (Intel© TXT) with Intel© Boot Guard Technology (Intel© BtG) merging redundant structures into the Boot Policy Manifest (BPM). Specifically, some of the information that the OEM previously provided in the Firmware Information Table (FIT), in the TPM PS Index, and PS Policy the OEM now provides in the *Boot Policy Manifest* (BPM). In addition, new features have been added and the OEM establishes policies for these features via the BPM. This integration is referred to herein as Intel BTG/TXT.

To support either Intel TXT or Intel BtG, the OEM is responsible for producing a *Key Manifest* (KM) and *Boot Policy Manifest* (BPM) and including them in the BIOS image. These manifests are locatable via FIT type 0x0b and 0x0c records. The BPM must be regenerated for each BIOS update.

The BPMGen2 Toolkit consists of several tools:

* The ***BPMGen2*** tool is a Windows DOS based application designed to generate the *Boot Policy Manifest* (BPM) and can be used in a batch file to automatically update the BIOS image with the new BPM. It can also generate a *Key Manifest*.
* The ***BpmGen2GUI*** is a Windows GUI based tool that will generate the *BPM Parameters* file needed for the BpmGen2 tool and can also generate a *Key Manifest* (KM).

For Intel BTG/TXT the BPM was enhanced to include new structures and the KM was modified to support KM public Key Hash algorithm agility and add the ability to authenticate multiple keys. The BPM and KM can support RSA and SM2 signing (in preparation for ACMs that support SM2).

When using the BpmGen2 tool to build a new BPM, instead of having a long complicated command line required for the old BpmGen tool, you now provide a *BPM parameters* file (aka: Bpm Params). The Bpm Params file contains parameters that typically don’t change from build to build. The Bpm Params file is a text file of particular format. You can use the BPMGen2GUI tool to build the Bpm Params file or you can simply edit an existing Bpm Params file.

* Chapter 2 explains how to use the BpmGen2 tool
* Chapter 3 provides specifics on editing the Bpm Params file
* The remaining chapters and appendixes provide details on specific features.

## Tool Capabilities

The BpmGen2 tool is capable of:

* Generating a new v2.1 BPM
* Generating a new v2.1 KM
* Generating a legacy 1.0 BPM
* Generating a legacy 1.0 KM
* Updating the Firmware file with the new BPM and KM
* Displaying a BPM or KM
* Displaying the BtG components of a Firmware file (FIT, BPM, KM), and the key hashes
* Internal or external BPM/KM manifest signing
  + RSASSA Pkcsv1.5 and RSASSA\_PSS
  + ECC-P256 and ECC-P384
  + SM2
* Supporting the following Hash algorithms:
  + SHA256
  + SHA384
  + SHA512
  + SM3
  + SHA1
* Prepending *Boot Partition Descriptor Tables* to the Firmware file (for BFX)

The BpmGen2GUI tool is capable of:

* Generating the BPM Parameter file (\*.bpDef) used by the BpmGen2 tool
* Generating a new v2.1 KM
* Generating a legacy 1.0 KM
* Internal or external KM manifest signing
  + RSASSA Pkcsv1.5 and RSASSA\_PSS using SHA256,SHA384, SHA512
  + SM2 using SM3

## References

Table Reference Documents

| Document/Toolkit | Document No. /Location |
| --- | --- |
| 1. “Intel® BTG/TXT Server BIOS Specification” | IBL/CDI Doc# xxxxxx |
| 1. “Intel® BTG/TXT Server Design Guide” | IBL/CDI Doc# xxxxxx |
|  |  |
|  |  |

## Terminology

| **Term** | **Description** |
| --- | --- |
| ACM | *Authenticated Code Module*: Platform specific code created and signed by Intel. An ACM is authenticated by hardware and executed in an isolated environment within the processor. |
| Authentication | A cryptographic method of verifying both integrity and ownership of a binary module. A module signed with a private / public key pair can be cryptographically authenticated. Also, matching a cryptographic hash measurement of a module to a known good measurement. |
| BIOS ACM  BtG ACM  Startup ACM | An Intel provided ACM the OEM includes in the BIOS image. A portion of the ACM (referred to as Startup ACM or BtG ACM) executes before BIOS, contains BtG policy engine, and verifies BIOS code. For Intel TXT, the BIOS ACM is also invoked later by BIOS to perform certain security checks and functions. The terms Startup ACM, BIOS ACM, and BtG ACM refer to the same module. |
| BPM | Boot Policy Manifest – a structure signed by the OEM that establishes policies for Intel BtG and Intel TXT. |
| BPM Administrator | A person (or persons) that has the authority to sign a BPM using a particular signing key. There can be a different BPM administrators for different projects and the Key Manifest for a particular project specifies which key, and therefore which BPM administrator, is valid for the that project. |
| Intel BtG/TXT | *Intel BgG* converged with *Intel* *TXT* |
| DPR | *DMA Protected Range* – a region of system memory that is blocked to I/O device’s memory accesses to prevent I/O devices from gaining access to Intel TXT restricted memory. |
| FIT | *Firmware Interface Table* – A data structure embedded in BIOS so that Intel microcode and ACMs can locate BIOS components. |
| KM | Key Manifest – a structure signed by the OEM that establishes the validity of the key used to sign BPM. Each platform is permanently configured with a KM\_ID plus the hash of the KM public signing key such that only a KM with the same KM\_ID and signed with the matching private key will be considered valid. |
| KMID | Key Manifest Identifier – KMID values are arbitrarily assigned by the OEM and typically used as a project ID to control which BPM administrator is allowed to sign the BPM for that project. |
| KM Administrator | A person (or persons) that has the authority to sign a KM. The role of the KM administrator is to manage which BPM signing key, and therefore which BPM administrator, is authorized for a particular project. |
| Measurement | A cryptographic fingerprint of a binary module. Also called hash or digest. Hashing a binary module using a hash algorithm like SHA256 produces a unique hash digest value (the module’s measurement). It is not possible to derive the original binary from the hash bytes. |
| ME/SPS | Management Engine/Server Platform Services – Intel® Server Platform Services (Intel® SPS) firmware running in Intel® Management Engine (Intel® ME) microcontroller present in the chipset to perform security and other system functions. |
| NEM | Non-Eviction Mode |
| PCR | *Platform Credential Registers* -- Dedicated registers in the TPM (sometimes referred to as Platform Configuration Registers). |
| PS Index | Obsolete “platform supplier” TPM NV Index where platform vendor set TXT Policies. Now vendor TXT policies are specified in the BPM. |
| Startup ACM | See BtG ACM. |
| TCB | *Trusted Computing Base* – Includes all the elements capable of modifying/protecting the platform’s configuration. |
| TPM | *Trusted Platform Module* – a hardware device defined by the TCG that provides a set of security features used by Intel TXT and Intel BtG. |
| Intel TXT | Intel Trusted Execution Technology. |
| VT-d | Virtualization Technology for Directed I/O – hardware support component of Intel® Virtualization Technology for managing DMA and interrupts generated by I/O devices. |

# BpmGen2 Tool Fundamentals

The BpmGen2 tool’s primary purpose it to take your initial BIOS file (after it has been updated with a Firmware Interface Table (FIT)), create a Boot Policy Manifest (BPM) signed by you, insert that BPM into the BIOS image and save the updated BIOS image to a file that can be used to create a SPI Flash device or a file that can be used to create a Boot Partition file (for platforms booting from a block media device).



Figure Tool Chain

## Getting Started

The BpmGen2 tool has many options. This section provides an overview on using the most common features. See Appendix B “Recommendations” for some advanced topics and hints on how to better use the tool.

* This tool (BpmGen2) generates the Version 2 BPM (for platforms that support converged BtG/TXT). Older platforms require a Version 1 BPM. The BpmGen2 tool is also capable of generating a v1 BPM, which is a subset of Version 2.
* The BPM must be updated for each BIOS release. The BpmGen2 tool is designed to do that as part of a batch file that you run to build the BIOS (i.e., build BIOS image, generate the FIT, then use this tool to update BPM).
* You must reserve space for the BPM in your BIOS image (via FIT Type 0xC record) that is at least as large as your actual BPM. There are a number of factors which affect BPM size (see Table 2 Typical Manifest Sizes). FYI: An example BPM signed with a 3072-bit RSA key using SHA384 can be 1341 bytes plus the size of any Platform Manufacture’s data that you wish to add.
* The tool can automatically replace that dummy BPM with your actual BPM.
* There is a companion tool (BpmGen2GUI) that builds a parameter file used by this tool, or you can manually edit one of the sample parameter files (\*.bpDef).
* Typically, the parameter file does not change from build to build. However, you might want to use a different parameter file during debug than for the final production worthy BIOS.
* The BpmGen2 tool is capable of also replacing the KM. Typically, the KM does not change from build to build. So you may want to just imbed the actual KM in the original BIOS image.
* You can either use this tool of the BpmGen2GUI tool to produce your KM.
* Both the KM and BPM must be signed. The tools can generate the signature or you can use an external signing service.
* The key used to sign the KM is considered a master key, because the KM authorizes the key that signs the BPM. See Annex B.1 “Master and Subordinate Keys” for more information
* The manufacturing process must program the hash of the KM Public signing key into the chipset’s Field Programmable Fuses (FPFs). The BpmGen2 tool can calculate/display the KM Public signing key hash value.
* Using a different key for signing the BPM allows you to authorize different BIOS authorities. That is, each BIOS developer/provider can have their own key, which the KM administratore are able to revoke if needed.

Typically you will need to:

1. Use either the BpmGen2 tool or the BpmGen2GUI tool to build one or more Key Manifests
2. Use the BpmGen2GUI to create/edit your BPM Parameters file
3. Use the BpmGen2 tool to update create the BPM and update your BIOS image

## Capabilities

The BPMGen2 tool can:

* Generate a KM based on command line arguments and save it to a file.
* Generate a BPM based on the specified BIOS image and your BPM Parameter file:
  + save the BIOS image updated with the new BPM (and optionally a specified KM)
  + save the new BPM to a file to be manually imported into the BIOS
* Display the FIT/BPM/KM information for a specified BIOS image.
* Display a BPM or KM given a BPM or KM file.

A BPM must be signed and the tools support both internal and external signing.

Note: Supported algorithms and key sizes vary by platform. Please check platform requirements

The tool supports the following hashing algorithms:

* SHA256
* SHA384
* SHA512
* SM3

The tools supports the following signing algorithms:

* RSASSA-PKCS v1.5 signatures with 2048 and 3072 bit keys
* RSASSA-PSS signatures with 2048 and 3072 bit keys
* ECDSA signatures with:
  + NIST P256 Curve (256-bit key) w/ SHA256, SHA384, & SHA512
  + NIST P-384 Curve (384-bit key) w/ SHA384, & SHA512
  + Chinese SM2 Curve (256-bit key) w/ SM3

Note: No platforms support ECC at this time. Use of any scheme other than RSASSA-PKCS v1.5 is platform specific

## BIOS Requirements

* The BIOS image must include a Firmware Interface Table (FIT).
* FIT Pointer must be at 0xFFFFFFFC (0x40 below Top of Low Memory).
* FIT must include a Type 0x0b KM record and a Type 0x0c BPM record.
* Size indicated in those records must be large enough for the new manifests.

## Manifest Sizes

The size of the BPM and KM will vary with the selected hash algorithms and signature key type & key size. The size of the BPM also has a number of variable sized elements:

* IBB Element contains a variable number of segments (12 bytes per segment), 8 segments max
* TXT Element (optional) – in the future it might also include a variable number of segments
* Platform Config Data Element (optional) specifies the Power Down Request location
* Platform Manufacture’s Element (optional) – arbitrary size

The following table provides you with some insight into the size that you need to reserve for the manifests.

Table Typical Manifest Sizes

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Manifest | Hash Alg | Signing Key Type/Size | Typical Manifest Size |
| KM w/1Key | SHA384 | RSA 3072 | 869 (0x365) bytes |
| KM w/1Key | SHA256 | RSA 2048 | 597 (0x255) bytes |
| KM w/1Key | SM3 | SM2 (256) | 213 (0x0D5) bytes |
|  |  |  |  |
| BPM w/8 IBB segments | SHA384 | RSA 3072 | 1341 (0x53D) bytes |
| BPM w/8 IBB segments | SHA256 | RSA 2048 | 1053 (0x41D) bytes |
| BPM w/8 IBB segments | SM3 | SM2 (256) | 669 (0x29D) bytes |
| BPM sizing includes typical TXT Element, max PCD Element, and no PM Element.  In the future, the size of elements could increase and there could be additional elements. | | | |

A rule of thumb is to allocate at least 0x400 bytes for KM and 0x600 bytes for BPM

## Using the Tool

### Required Files

To use the tool, the following files from the toolkit need to be in your working directory:

* BpmGen2.exe (the tool)
* The following DLL files from the toolkit
  + ippccp8-9.0.dll
  + ippcore-9.0.dll
  + ippcp-9.0.dll
  + ippcpp8-9.0.dll
* BIOS file to update/analyze
* BPM Parameter file
* Public signing key (a PEM, DER, or binary file)
* Private signing key (if using the tool to sign the BPM)
* Batch file for signing (if externally signing the BPM)
* Key Manifest binary file (optional)

### Main Functions

The tools main functions are:

* BpmGen2 GEN : Generates a v1.0 or v2.0 BPM depending on the BPM Parameter file
* BpmGen2 KMGEN : Generates a v2.0 KM
* BpmGen2 KM1GEN : Generates a v 1.0 KM
* BpmGen2 INFO : Displays KM, BPM, or BIOS information

BKM: Issuing the command specifying only the main function without any additional parameters (i.e., BpmGen2 GEN ) displays the syntax for that function.

The following sections provide the syntax for invoking the tool. The tool is designed to be invoked from the DOS prompt or as part of a batch file.

The main form for the syntax is:

ToolName OPERATION Required parameters Additional (optional) parameters

* All command line parameters are case insensitive (i.e., you can use upper and/or lower case characters).
* The syntax uses tags followed by zero or more variables (such as filename). Tags are shown in UPPERCASE with “-“ as the first character (e.g., -TAG <filename>).
* Variables are shown encased in <…>.
* Optional parameters are indicated by brackets “[…]” and starts with a tag.

### Syntax for Displaying Boot Policy Information

BpmGen2 INFO <BiosFile>

-- displays the FIT, BPM, KM, and other information and calculates key hash values

BpmGen2 INFO <KM or BPM filename>

-- displays the KM or BPM, and verifies its signature

### Syntax for BPM Generation



BpmGen2 GEN <BIOSFileToUpdate> <BpmParamsFile> [-BPM <BpmOutputFileName>] [-U <UpdatedBIosFilename> [-KM <KeyManifiestFile>] ]

Either –BPM or –U (or both) must be specified

-BPM instructs the tool to save the BPM binary to the specified filename

-U directs the tool to update the BIOS file with the new BPM (and KM if specified) and then save the updated BIOS image to the specified filename.

-KM instructs the tool to replace the KM in the updated BIOS image with the specified KM.

To use the –U option, the original BIOS file (BIOSFileToUpdate) must have a Firmware Interface Table (FIT) that includes a Type 0x0c BPM record. This indicates where the tool will place the BPM. The size for this location must be equal or greater that the size of the new BPM.

To use the –KM option, the FIT must include a Type 0x0b KM record indicating where the tool will replace the KM and the size for that location must be equal or greater that the size of the specified KM.

Note that unlike the BPM, which must be updated for each BIOS build, the KM is typically only generated once per project and thus you have the option of including it in the original BIOS file (BIOSFileToUpdate) or having the tool insert it (-KM KeyManifiestFile) at the same time it updates the BIOS image with the new BPM.

To generate a modified BIOS with an updated BPM, you would use the following form:

BpmGen2 GEN <BIOSFileToUpdate> <BpmParamsFile> -U <UpdatedBIosFilename>

Which creates a new BPM based on the BIOSFileToUpdate plus BpmParamsFile and generates an updated BIOS image with the new BPM saving it to UpdatedBIosFilename.

The BpmParamsFile contains static policy settings (i.e., the settings that typically don’t change from build to build). See Chapter 3 “BPM PARAMS File” for details.

Example:

BpmGen2 GEN BiosFile.Fd MyBpmParams.bpDef -U UpdatedBiosFile.Fd -KM MyKM.bin

Additional command line arguments include the following:

[-BLOCK [ <TsSize> ] ] : must be used with the –U option and instructs the tool to generate a BPM for a platform the boots from a block device (in contrast to booting from a SPI flash device) and also prepends Boot Partition Descriptor Tables to the BIOS image. TsSize is the Block Top Swap size. See Annex 6 “Boot from Block”.

### Syntax for KM Generation



Note: using the BpmGen2GUI tool provides a more user-friendly way to generate a Key Manifest.

BpmGen2 KMGEN -KEY <BpKeyFileName> <keyParams> -KM <KmOutputFilename> [Optional settings] {Signing directive}

BpmGen2 KM1GEN -BPKEY <BpKeyFileName> -KM <KmOutputFilename> [Optional settings] {Signing directive}

Generates a signed KM where:

“KM1GEN” creates a v1.0 KM (for platforms prior to converged BGT/TXT) while “KMGEN” create a v2.1 KM.

Optional settings are not order dependent, Default value is used if not specified, and include:

–KMID <value 0-15> Default is 1

–SVN <value 0-15> Default is 1

–KMVERSION <value 0-255> Default is 1

–BPKHASH <SHA256 | SHA384 | SM3> (v1 only) hash alg used to create BPM Key Hash. Default is SHA256

–KMKHASH <SHA256 | SM3> (v2 only) hash alg used to create KM Key Hash. Default is SHA256

–SIGHASHALG <SHA256 | SHA384 | SM3> hash alg used in signing. Default is SHA256

–SIGALG <RSA | ECC> key algorithm. Default is RSA (use ECC for SM2 signing)

–SCHEME <RSASSA | RSAPSS | ECDSA | SM2> signing algorithm. Default is RSASSA

Signing directive must be one of the following:

–SIGNKEY <PrivateKeyFileName>] [–SIGNPUBKEY <KeyFileName>] Note: PubKey only needed when PrivateKey does not contain the public key (most private key structures do).

–XSIGN <DataFile> <BatchFile> <sigFile> –SIGNPUBKEY <KeyFileName> [-OUTHASH] Tool will generate KM body and save it to <datafile>, invoke <BatchFile> and then read the signature from <sigFile>. If you include the -OUTHASH option, the tool will output the hash of the KM body instead of the KM body. Your batch file is expected to take the <datafile>, and create <sigFile>, which is a binary signature the size of the binary public key. See 4.4 “External Signing”.

[-KEY <BpKeyFileName><keyParams>] can be repeated to authorize multiple keys (v2 only)

<KeyParams> can be any of the following:

[SHA256 | SHA384 | SM3] - Specifies the hash algorithm for creating the KeyHash (Default: SHA256)

[BPM] [FPM] [ACMM] [SDEV] [...] - Specifies Key usage (BPM, FIT Manifest, ACM Manifest, etc.) Default: BPM

-U:<hexValue> - Specifies Key usage value (for setting usage bits not yet defined)

example: -U:83 would set BPM[0] FPM[1] and bit 7

BPM FPM -U:80 would also set BPM[0] FPM[1] and bit 7

Typically, the KM is used to only authorize the BPM public signing key. If you do have the need to authorize additional keys, the BPM key should be first.

A typical usage to have the tool sign the KM would be:

BpmGen2 KMGEN -KEY BpmPublic.pem BPM -KM MyKM.bin –SIGNKEY KmPrivate.pem

Or (for external signing):

BpmGen2 KMGEN -KEY BpmPublic.pem BPM -KM MyFirstKM.bin –XSIGN Data2Sign.SignIt.bat Signature.bin

# BPM PARAMS File

An example BPM PARAMS file is provided in Appendix C. The BpmGen2GUI tool can be used to generate/edit BPM PARAM files, but the BPM PARAM file is easily modified using a text editor. Let’s look at the various sections of the BPM Params file and your options.

* Don’t change the first 3 lines.
* Lines starting with // are comments and are ignored by the BPMGen2 tool. You may insert or delete comments, but comments cannot be added to the end of line i.e., “//” must be the first characters of the line.
* Lines starting with **#** are section labels and must not be modified (nor moved).
* The remaining lines use the format: TAG: Value – Don’t change the TAG.
* Some tags are used only by the BpmGen2GUI tool that generates the bpDef file and are ignored by the BpmGen2 tool. Tags of interest are highlighted inGreenfont in this chapter.
* Some values (such as algorithm IDs) contain a numeric value (decimal or hex), followed by a “:” and then text. The text is ignored by the tool but makes it easier for human interpretation. Thus, just changing that text doesn’t change anything.
* The following subsections provide information on the values that you may modify.

## BPM\_DEF

Must be the first section, starts with the **“# BPM\_DEF**” label, and there must be exactly one.

# BPM\_DEF

PlatformRules: Server-V2

**BpmStrutVersion**: 0x21

**BpmRevision**: 0x01

**BpmRevocation**: 1

**AcmRevocation**: 2

**NEMPages**: 3

IbbSetCount: 1

CurrentIbbSet: 0

BpmStrutVersion: Typically 0x21 to build version 2 BPM. Setting this to 0x10 builds a v1.0 BPM.

BpmRevision: You specify an arbitrary value for BPM revision so you can identify different BPM builds. Max values is 0xFF (255).

BpmRevocation and AcmRevocation are used to revoke BPMs and ACMs respectively (aka anti-rollback). BpmRevocation is the BPM’s SVN (Security Version Number) and AcmRevocation is compared to the ACM’s SVN. Their values may be 0-15 (0x0 – 0xF). If for any reason you need to revoke a previous BPM, just increment BpmRevocation and BPMs with lower SVN values will no longer be accepted once the platform boots using a valid BIOS with the newer BPM. AcmRevocation is only effective if it matches the value of the ACM. Intel will inform OEMs if an ACM ever needs to be revoked. ACMs with SVN of 0 or 1 are considered Non-Production-Worthy and thus production Qualified ACMs will always have SVNs greater than 1. See Annex B.5 “Revoking Keys”.

Warning: Once BpmRevocation is incremented, its value is permanently saved on platforms that boot with the new BPM and cannot be rolled back. Thus, there is a maximum of 15 BPM revocations. So only revoke BPMs that pose a security concern.

NEMPages: BtG automatically allocates enough Non-Eviction Mode (NEM) memory in processor cache to hold the IBB segments (both measured and Post IBB, however it only loads the measured segments). Here you can specify the number of additional pages that BIOS needs for data it also wants protected. Note that the total number of pages depends on the processor’s cache size and thus specifying too large of a number could result in a failure. Client processors tend to have smaller cache sizes than server processors.

IbbSetCount and CurrentIbbSet are only used by the tool that creates the BPM PARAMS file.

## IBB SET

Section starts with the “# IBB\_SET” label and in the future there might be multiple IBB\_SET sections (e.g., one for IBB Cold Boot Set and one for S3Resume Set). Currently, only the ColdBoot set can be included.

# IBB\_SET

IbbSetType: 0:ColdBoot

IbbSetInclude: TRUE

**PBETValue**: 3

**MCHBAR**:

**VTD\_BAR**:

//DMA Protection

**DmaProtBase0**:

**DmaProtLimit0**:

**DmaProtBase1**:

**DmaProtLimit1**:

**IbbFlags**: 0x6

// Bit0 : Enable DMA Protection

// Bit1 : Issue TPM Start-up from Locality 3

// Bit2 : Extend Authority Measurements into the Authority PCR

// Bit3 : On error: Leave TPM Hierarchies enabled. Cap all PCRs

// Bit4 : BIOS supports Top Swap

**DmaProtAutoCalc**: TRUE

**IbbHashAlgID**: 0x0B:SHA256

**IbbEntry**: 0xFFFFFFF0

**PostIbbHashAlgID**: 0x10:NULL

**PostIBBHashSource**: Calculate

**PostIbbHashFile**: PostIbbDigest.hash

**IbbSegSource**: FIT

IbbSegFile:

**IbbGuid**: 4a4ca1c6-871c-45bb-8801-6910a7aa5807

**ObbHashAlgID**: 0x0B:SHA256

**ObbHashSource**: List

**ObbHashFile**: 32Byte.hash

**ObbGuid**: 9e21fd93-9c72-4c15-8c4b-e77f1db2d792: Example GUID

**ObbGuid**: 7bb28b99-61bb-11d5-9a5d-0090273fc14d: Example GUID 2//

# MINOR\_VERSION\_ADDITIONS: 1

IbbSetType: One of {0:ColdBoot, 1:S3Resume} Tool only looks at first character, which must be 0 or 1. Most projects require a ColdBoot set and do not support other sets. Check the platform requirements.

IbbSetInclude: If FALSE, this set will be excluded from the BPM. Must be true for ColdBoot set. Must be FALSE for any Set Type the target ACM does not support. BpmGen2 tool will ignore sets with IbbSetInclude == FALSE.

PBETValue: You specify the number of additional seconds BIOS needs for the *Protect BIOS Environment Timer*. Max value is 31. Actual timeout value will be 5s plus this value. PBET is started when the ACM invokes the BIOS code at the specified entry point. If BIOS does not stop the PBET timer before it times out, the platform will start the enforcement action for invalid BIOS.

See Chapter 4.7 “DMA Protection” for details on setting the following values.

MCHBAR: 64 bit value exactly as it is to be written to the MCHBAR

VTD\_BAR: 64 bit value exactly as it is to be written to the VT-d BAR

Note MCHBAR and VTD\_BAR ranges must exclude:

1. The flash range. [In HSW-ULT this is: 0xFFE00000 - 0xFFFFFFFF)
2. LT space [FED2\_0000 thru FED3\_FFFF]
3. Extended reserved/LT ranges [FED4\_0000 thru FED7\_FFFF]
4. The address space occupied by the ACM

BtG sets up DMA protection if you desire (IbbFlags.Bit0) using the following:

* DmaProtBase0 and DmaProtLimit0: 0x0 if not used
* DmaProtBase1 and DmaProtLimit1: 0x0 if not used

IbbFlags:

* Bit0 : Enable DMA protection (VT-d on client platforms and GenProt registers on server platforms)
* Bit1 : Issue TPM Start-up from Locality 3
* Bit2 : Extend Authority Measurements into the Authority PCR
* Bit3 : On error: Leave TPM Hierarchies enabled. Cap all PCRs
* Bit4 : BIOS supports Top Swap for BIOS Update recovery

DmaProtAutoCalc: If TRUE, tool will calculate DmaProtBase0 and DmaProtLimit0 to cover all of the IBB segments (IBB[0] to 4GB).

IbbHashAlgID: Algorithm the tool uses to calculate the measured IBB Segments. The tool only evaluates the number portion of the Value. Tool supported values are 0x0B:SHA256, 0x0C:SHA384, 0x0D:SHA512, 0x12:SM3.

PostIbbHashAlgID: Algorithm used to calculate the Post IBB Segments. The tool only evaluates the number portion of the value. Tool supported values are 0x0B:SHA256, 0x0C:SHA384, 0x0D:SHA512, 0x12:SM3, 0x10:NULL.

IbbEntry: Specify the BIOS entry point for when BtG verification is successful. See platform specs for limitations.

PostIBBHashSource: Specify either *Calculate* if tool is to calculate the PostIbbHash digest or *File* it the tool is to read the digest from a file. Not used when PostIbbHashAlgID is 0x10:NULL. Selecting *Calculate* instructs the tool to calculate the hash of the non-measured IBB segments. Note that if IbbSegSource == FIT, then there are no non-measured IBB segments and either (a) PostIBBHashSource must be FILE (tool reads hash value) or (b) PostIbbHashAlgID must be NULL (there is no PostIbbHash digest.

PostIbbHashFile: enter filename if PostIBBHashSource == File

IbbSegSource: May be FIT or BIOS INFO, Table (see 4.6.3” Specifying the Source for IBB Segments)”.

IbbSegFile: for future use

IbbGuid: If IbbSegSource == BIOS INFO, then enter the GUID for the module that contains the BiosInfoTable.

The OBB Hash is not used by BtG, but rather by BIOS to validate the code after IBB. Thus the following components are included in the BPM to provide BIOS with authenticated values it can use to verify the remaining BIOS validity. Thus the definition of OBB is up to the BIOS developer and platform architect. See Annex 7 “OBB Hash” for more details. If BIOS does not use these components, then just set ObbHashAlgID = NULL.

ObbHashAlgID: Algorithm used to calculate the OBB hash digest. The tool only evaluates the number portion of the value. Tool supported values are 0x0B:SHA256, 0x0C:SHA384, 0x0D:SHA512, 0x12:SM3, 0x10:NULL.

ObbHashSource: Specify how the tool acquires the OBB Hash digest value. See Annex 7 “OBB Hash”. Not used when ObbHashAlgID is 0x10:NULL. Selecting anything other than FILE instructs the tool to calculate the hash from a section of the BIOS file. The tool accepts the following values:

* *File* : the tool is to read the digest from a file
* *Base* : Tool will calculate the hash from start of the BIOS image until the first IBB segment
* *List* : Tool will calculate the ObbHash digest using a list of UEFI Fv File GUIDs
* *Start GUID* : Tool will calculate the hash starting from the first byte of the Fv file indicated by the first Obb GUID specified until the first IBB segment.

ObbHashFile: enter filename if ObbHashSource == File

ObbGuid: If ObbSegSource == *LIST*, then enter the GUID for an Fv File to include in the hash measurement. Repeat this line for each file to be included. If ObbSegSource == *START GUID*, then enter the GUID for Fv File that marks the start point. Only the first ObbGuid line will be used.

## TXT ELEMENT

# TXT\_ELEMENT

**TxtInclude**: TRUE

**TxtFlags**: 0x80000041

// [4:0] = TXT execution profile

// 00000b – Use Default based on HW

// 00001b - Server Profile

// 00010b - Client Profile

// [6:5] = “Memory scrubbing” policy

// 00b – Default (BiosVerified?BIOS:MemDepletion)

// 01b - Only BIOS

// 10b – Only MemDepletion

// [7:8] = Backup policy

// 00b – Default

// 01b – Force power down

// 10b – Force unbreakable shutdown

// [31] = Reset AUX control (1=AUX Reset leaf will delete AUX Index)

//MemoryDepletion Power Down

**AcpiBase**: 0x400

**PwrmBase**: 0xFE000000

**PdUseDefault**: TRUE

**PdMinutes**: 5

**PdSeconds**: 10

**PttCmosOffset0**: 0x7E

**PttCmosOffset1**: 0x7F

//TXTE Segments

**TxtSegSource**: IBB

**TxtSegGuid**: 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000

**TxtSegHashAlgID**: 0x10:NULL

//

This is an optional element

TxtInclude: Set to TRUE to include the TXT Element or FALSE to exclude it

TxtFlags: This is the value that the tool will place in TXT Flags and is composed of the following bits:

[4:0] = **TXT execution profile** – for server platforms this must be 00000b, for client platforms:

00000b – Use Default based on the platform’s HW

00001b – Unified (Server) Profile

00010b - Client Profile

[6:5] = **Memory scrubbing** policy for Surprise Reset – server platforms typically only support 00b

00b – Default – ACM allows BIOS to scrub memory only if ColdBoot set verifies, else Backup policy

01b – ACM always allows BIOS to scrub memory

10b – ACM always resorts to *Backup Policy* to scrub memory

[7:8] = **Backup policy** – action to take to protect memory content when BIOS cannot scrub memory. Server platforms typically only support 00b.

00b – Default (for servers: Force unbreakable shutdown, for client platforms: Force power interval)

01b – Force power down for specified interval (Power Down Memory Depletion)

10b – Force unbreakable shutdown

[31] = **Reset AUX control**

0 – When BIOS invokes GETSEC[ResetAux] the ACM will reset the AUX index.

1 – When BIOS invokes GETSEC[ResetAux] the ACM will delete the AUX Index – Should only be set for a BIOS used during platform refurbishing and MUST never be set for a BIOS that will be shipped to customers.

The following elements establish *Power Down Memory Depletion* parameters (see section 5 “Power Down Memory Depletion”).

AcpiBase: Value the ACM needs to program into PCI configuration register BAR2 of device Bus 0 : Device 31 : Function 2 : Register 0x20 to map fixed ACPI IO registers into IO bus. Default is 0x400.

PwrmBase: Value ACM will program into PCI configuration register PWRMBASE of device Bus 0 : Device 31 : Function 2 : Register 0x10 to map fixed ACPI MMIO registers into memory bus. Default is 0xFE000000.

PdUseDefault: Set to TRUE to use the ACM’s default power down duration. Set to FALSE to use the value specified by PdMinutes and PdSeconds, which specify the minimum time to power down the platform to ensure memory content is lost.

PttCmosOffset0: Location of a byte in CMOS memory the ACM can use (must be unused and in bank 0, i.e., 0-127)

PttCmosOffset1: Location of another byte in CMOS memory the ACM can use

TXT Segments provides the ACM with a list of segments that BIOS executes when it scrubs memory when that code is not part of the measured IBB Cold Boot set. Currently, most platforms require BIOS memory scrubbing code be part of the measured IBB cold Boot set.

TxtSegSource: Choice of {IBB, FIT, or BIOS INFO}. The value IBB tells ACM to use the IBB ColdBoot set as defined above, otherwise the tool generates segments from the FIT or from a BIOS Info Table (see 4.6.3” Specifying the Source for IBB Segments)”. Most platforms require a value of IBB.

TxtSegGuid: if TxtSegSource == BIOS INFO, then enter the GUID for the module with the BiosInfoTable

TxtSegHashAlgID: Must be 0x10:NULL if TxtSegSource == IBB. Otherwise must be one of {0x0B:SHA256, 0x0C:SHA384, 0x0D:SHA512, 0x12:SM3} and the tool will generate the list of TXT segments and calculate their hash.

## PLATFORM\_CONFIG\_ELEMENT

This element provides the ACM with the information about the platform. Specifically for specifying a location that BIOS can use to request the ACM perform *Power Down Memory Depletion*. See section 5.2 “On Demand Power Down Memory Depletion”. This location must be non-volatile so the architecture allows you to specify either a CMOS location (must be in the first CMOST bank so it is accessible at power on) or you can use a TPM NV Index. Since platforms might have a different family of TPM, you can specify up to 3 NV Indexes (one for TPM1.2, 2.0, and PTT).

# PLATFORM\_CONFIG\_ELEMENT

**PdReqLocation**: TPM

// Power down request location for CMOS

**CmosIndexRegister**: 0x70

**CmosDataRegister**: 0x71

**CmosIndexOffset**: 125

**CmosBitFieldWidth**: 3

**CmosBitFieldPosition**: 0

// Power down request location for TPM1.2

# TPM1.2\_LOCATION

**TpmIndexHandle**: 0x50000004

**TpmByteOffset**: 7

**TpmBitFieldWidth**: 3

**TpmBitFieldPosition**: 0

// Power down request location for TPM2.0

# TPM2.0\_LOCATION

TpmIndexHandle: 0x01C10104

TpmByteOffset: 7

TpmBitFieldWidth: 3

TpmBitFieldPosition: 0

// Power down request location for PTT

# PTT\_LOCATION

TpmIndexHandle: 0x01C10104

TpmByteOffset: 7

TpmBitFieldWidth: 3

TpmBitFieldPosition: 0

//

PdReqLocation: Choices are {TPM, CMOS}, informs the ACM whether the BIOS will use CMOS or the TPM as a mailbox where BIOS can request that the ACM perform the *Power Down Memory Depletion* sequence.

The following identifies the *Power Down* *Request* location in CMOS – must be present if PdReqLocation == CMOS, otherwise they are not used if present.

CmosIndexRegister: Address of IO register to write the CMOS Index offset (CmosIndexOffset)

CmosDataRegister: Address of IO register to read/write the CMOS data at the CMOS index offset

CmosIndexOffset: Value to write to CmosIndexRegister (must be in bank 0)

CmosBitFieldWidth: number of bits - MUST be at least 3 and should be 3

CmosBitFieldPosition: bit offset within the CmosDataRegister that contains the BIOS request

The following identify the *Power Down Request* location in a TPM NV Index – Can be up to 3 (one for TPM1.2, one for TPM2.0, and one of PTT) - at least one set must be present if PdReqLocation == TPM, otherwise (for PdReqLocation == CMOS) they are not used if present.

Each subsection is preceded by a marker line indicating the type of TPM ( # TPM1.2\_LOCATION, # TPM2.0\_LOCATION, # PTT\_LOCATION). If the platform will never have a particular type of TPM (such as PTT), then you may remove that subsection or just set the value of TpmIndexHandle to 0.

TpmIndexHandle: the NV Index handle

TpmByteOffset: The byte offset of the NV Data

TpmBitFieldWidth: The width of the request in bits (must be at least 3 and should be 3)

TpmBitFieldPosition: The bit offset of the request location starting at the TpmByteOffset.

## PLATFORM\_MANUFACTURERS\_ELEMENT

# PLATFORM\_MANUFACTURERS\_ELEMENT

PmdeInclude: FALSE

PmdeFile:

//

The PM Element is optional and provides a means for you to provide whatever information you need to BIOS, if any, that needs to be protected by the BPM signature.

PmdeInclude: Set to FALSE to exclude this element and set to TRUE to include it.

PmdeFile: If PmdeInclude == TRUE, then the content of this file will be placed in the BPM (but ignored by the ACM). This must be a file that is available to the BpmGen2 tool when it is executed. File size must be an integer number of DWORDs.

## BPM\_SIGNATURE

# BPM\_SIGNATURE

**BpmSigSource**: Internal

**BpmSigHashAlgID**: 0x0B:SHA256

**BpmSigKeyType**: 0x01:RSA

**BpmSigScheme**: 0x14:RSASSA

**BpmKeySizeBits**: 2048

**BpmSigPubKey**: SamplePublicKeyRsa2048.pem

**BpmSigPrivKey**: SamplePrivateKeyRsa2048.pem

**BpmSigBatch**: ExampleExternalSigning.bat

**BpmSigData**: Bpm2Sign.bin

**BpmSigDataType**: BPM Body

**BpmSigXSig**: X-SignedBpmSig.bin

//

BpmSigSource: Choice of {Internal, External} – informs the tool whether it will sign the BPM or it will call your batch file for signing it.

BpmSigHashAlgID: Choice of {0x0B:SHA256, 0x0C:SHA384, 0x0D:SHA512, 0x12:SM3} – the hash algorithm for signing.

BpmSigKeyType: Choice of {0x01:RSA, 0x23:ECC} – use ECC for SM signing.

BpmSigScheme: Choice of {0x14:RSASSA, 0x14:RSAPSS, 0x18:ECDSA, 0x1B:SM2} – ECDSA not currently supported by any platform. Check with your platforms specification for which signing schemes are supported.

BpmKeySizeBits: Specify key size (2048 or 3072 for RSA keys otherwise 256 or 384 for ECC/SM2 keys)

BpmSigPubKey: Specify the Public Key file (typically a PEM file, may be DER or binary). File does not need to be specified if internal signing and private key file also contains the public key.

BpmSigPrivKey: Specify the Public Key file (typically a PEM file, may be DER or binary). File only needs to be specified when BpmSigSource == Internal.

BpmSigBatch: Specify the batch file the tool will invoke if BpmSigSource == External.

BpmSigData: Specify the name of the file the tool creates (for BPM body to be signed or Hash of Bpm body to be signed) when BpmSigSource == External.

BpmSigDataType: Specify if tool writes BPM body or hash of BPM body to BpmSigData file when BpmSigSource == External. Default is BPM Body.

BpmSigXSig: Specify the name of the file the tool reads to get the signature when BpmSigSource == External.

# Understanding Your Role and Responsibilities

Editorial Note: I have been developing tools for Intel TXT, Intel BtG, TPM, and other security technologies for many years and realize that trying to understand what you need just by reading the technology specs, platform specs, and BIOS specs can be challenging. So I put together this guide to help you better understand what you need to do and the options you have. In the context of honesty, I am not a BIOS developer, so I cannot provide you all the details. Also, my primary focus (and thus expertise) has been on server platforms. However, I do work with architects for client platform technologies to produce tools (like this BpmGen2 tool) that works for both client and server platforms. Disclaimer, this document only focuses on creating the manifests and is by no means a complete guide on either BtG or TXT. Furthermore, I tend to simplify. So for any discrepancy between this document and the specifications, the specifications should take precedence. Lastly, security technologies advance at an aggressive pace and so this document might not cover the latest developments, especially concerning what is or is not supported by client and server platforms.

In this guide, the term OEM refers to a combination of the platform architect, the BIOS developer, and manufacturing engineer. Each of these has a role in producing an Intel® Boot Guard compliant platform. The assumption is that the platform architect is responsible for overall direction, as well as creating the Key Manifest while the BIOS developer implements that direction and is responsible for producing the Boot Policy Manifest. If you are reading this document, I assume you are either the architect or the BIOS developer, so when I say OEM, I most likely mean you.

Note that some details are omitted or generalized for clarity.

## A note about BtG Profiles.

Part of the platform manufacturing process requires blowing *Field Programmable Fuses* (FPFs) that determine the platform’s support for Intel BtG and Intel TXT. A subset of those FPFs is known as the BtG Profile and there were Profiles 0 thru 5. Profiles #1 & #2 fell by the roadside and #3 is only for pre-production testing. Now, with the convergence with Intel TXT, there is another designator “T” added.

Here is an unofficial interpretation of the various profiles:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 0 | BIOS does not support either Intel BtG or Intel TXT (no KM or BPM required) – Platform does not do any BtG enforcement. |
| 0T | BIOS only supports Intel TXT, no BtG enforcement, but KM and BPM needed. – Server platforms do not support this profile because Server TXT depends on BtG protections. |
| 3 | Same as #5 (or #5T) except without strict enforcement (i.e., platforms continues to boot if BtG validation fails) allowing tools and other debugging efforts to execute. Used only for debug and not for production. |
| 3T |
| 4 | BtG support only - for platforms that do not have a TPM - platform enters unbreakable shutdown if BtG verification fails. |
| 5 | BtG support only - for platforms with a TPM. Platform enters unbreakable shutdown if BtG verification fails |
| 5T | BtG and TXT - platform enters unbreakable shutdown if BtG verification fails. |

Typically client platforms support profiles 0, 0T, 4, 5, 5T and server platforms support 0, 4, 5, 5T.

## Intel Boot Guard Overview

One of the primary purposes of Intel® Boot Guard (Intel BtG) is to verify that the BIOS code is what the OEM provided and has not been inadvertently or maliciously altered. To do this, an ACM provided by Intel executes before BIOS is allowed to execute. The ACM verifies the initial BIOS code and sets up protections to prevent attacks against that code. The BtG ACM needs to know what code to measure and its expected measurement. Thus the Boot Policy Manifest (BPM), created by and signed by the OEM, tells the ACM what to measure and what to protect.

Let’s define some terms:

* **Initial Boot Block** (**IBB**) – BIOS code that executes before memory initialization and needs to be protected by the ACM
* **Measured IBB** – the portion of the IBB that the ACM will measure and verify
* **Post IBB** – the rest of the IBB that the measured IBB will measure and verify
* **Other Boot Block** (**OBB**) – BIOS code that executes after memory initialization (verification and protection established by IBB)

The BPM provides a list of IBB segments where each segment has a flag telling the ACM if that segment is to be included in the verification measurement.

The ACM:

* Authenticates the Key Manifest (verifies KM structure and signature)
* Authenticates the BPM (verifies BPM structure and signature)
* Allocates processor cache as Non-Evict Memory (NEM) to cover all IBB
* Loads the Measured IBB segments into the NEM
* Verifies that that the measurement of the measured segments match the hash digest in the BPM
* If any of the authentication or verification steps fail, enter an unbreakable shutdown state.
* Sets up DMA protection (as per the BPM)

Once the measured IBB code is verified, it is allowed to execute and is expected to continue the chain of trust by measuring and verifying the rest of the code as follows:

* Load the PostIBB segments into NEM
* Verifies that that the measurement of the Post IBB segments match the PostIBB hash digest in the BPM
* Initializes memory
* Sets up protections (reconfigure DMA protection to cover IBB and OBB, etc.)
* Verifies that that the measurement of the OBB code matches the OBB hash digest in the BPM

Determining which BIOS modules constitute IBB and OBB is the BIOS developer’s responsibility. The ACM does nothing with the PostIbbHash and ObbHash values in the BPM, so their use is also left to BIOS developer.

Note that the IBB will need additional NEM to function as a stack. The “NEMPages” in the BPM Header tells the ACM how many additional pages of NEM the IBB needs. A typical value of 32 (0x20) provides for 128KB.

## Manifests

The purpose of the Key Manifest is to authenticate OEM keys, in particular the key that the OEM uses to sign the BPM. For authentication of the Key Manifest signature, the manufacturing process programs the hash digest of the public key portion of the KM signing key into the chipset’s Field Programmable Fuses (FPF’s). Intel BtG will verify that the public key in the KM signature block is in fact the public key specified by the FPF’s. And then it will verify the KM signature using that public key.

One of the components in the KM is the hash of the BPM’s public signing key. Intel BtG will then verify that the public key in the BPM signature block is in fact the public key specified in the KM. And then it will verify the BPM signature using that public key.

The OEM must create a Key Manifest, signed with the key provisioned into the FPFs that authorizes the key that will be used to sign the BPM.

See B.1 “Master and Subordinate Keys” for suggestions on using different keys for different platforms.

See B.2 “Development vs. Production” for some recommendations on how to use different key manifests during the debug and validation process.

## External Signing

While you might want to let the tool do the signing during development, the signing keys for production platforms must be protected. So you have the option to use your own signing service to sign the BPM. This is configured in the BPM Params file.

When BpmSigSource == External, the tool builds the BPM body, writes it to the file specified by BpmSigData, and then invokes the batch file specified by # BPM\_SIGNATURE.BpmSigData. Your batch file must sign BpmSigData and create a signature file (BpmSigXSig) which has the following format:

* For RSASSA signatures, a binary file containing a key size signature (i.e., signature[KeySize]). Typical of an OpenSSL RSA signature.
* For ECC (including SM2) either:

1. a binary file that contains a DER structure of Sequence { Integer R, Integer S}
2. a Binary file with R[keySize], S[KeySize] (i.e., the file length is exactly 2 \* KeySize)

R and S must be in Big Endian order. Which is typical for OpenSSL and other standard signing utilities.

#1 is typical for an OpenSSL ECC signature.

For example, we used the following OpenSSL command in a batch file to generate an external signature:

openssl dgst -SHA256 -sign SamplePrivateKeyRSA2048.pem -binary -out X-sig.bin Data2Sign.bin

Also, if you prefer the tool to output the digest of the BPM Body rather than the Bpm Body, you can set BpmSigDataType to HASH.

The same external signing concept applies to creating the Key Manifest.

## BPM

The OEM must create a Boot Policy Manifest, signed with the key specified in the KM.

The BPM consists of a header plus two or more elements:

* IBB Set Element – required. Specifies required information for Intel BtG.
* TXT Element – option element that specifies polices for Intel TXT
* Platform Configuration Data Element – optional element that specifies information the Power Down Memory Depletion process.
* Platform Manufacture’s Element – optional element that allows you to provide additional information in the BPM. Such as information the IBB needs to validate the OBB.
* Signature

The Entry point specified in the BPM IBB Set Element must be inside one of the IBB Measured Segments.

The IBB Set Element must contain at least one measured segment.

## Specifying IBB Segments

For each IBB set, the tool creates a list of IBB segments and calculate their composite hash measurement.

### IBB Sets

Currently, ACM’s only support a single set of IBB definitions, but you might notice implications of multiple Sets. This is an advanced topic and if you are curious, here is more information.

The BtG architecture allows for different sets of IBB depending on the state of the platform. For instance, the set of code that executes on a cold boot could be different than the code that executes after an S3 resume. Current platforms only support a single *IBB Cold Boot Set*. So you can ignore references to additional sets for now and just concentrate on the Cold Boot Set.

For future compatibility the BpmGen2 tool is designed to handle multiple IBB sets, and it is anticipated that additional sets, if/when supported, will be optional. Once multiple sets are supported, you will be able to select which sets will be included in the BPM via the *BPM PARAM’s* file. The configuration of each set is the same as for the Cold Boot Set.

### Tradeoffs

You specify which BIOS modules are part of the IBB (as measured and as post IBB segments). Refer to [2]“Intel® BTG/TXT Server Design Guide” for a discussion on what modules should be included.

There is no hard fast definition of what needs to be a measured IBB segment or a PostIbb segment. Also, there is no requirement that there be any Post IBB segments. It is up to you. You make that tradeoff and should consider boot latency and ease of implementation. An easy route might be to include all pre-memory code as measured IBB segments and therefore have no PostIBB segments. This is a good way to start. Let’s refer to this as Option-A. Later you might change to a more responsive model with PostIbb segments. Some considerations are:

* ACM execution occurs before any platform initialization. Processor and I/O are operating default speeds. So minimizing the amount of code that the ACM has to measure will reduce the ACM latency. Thus you might want to defer measurement of part of the IBB until after the measured IBB code initializes certain components that will improve performance and efficiency.
* Reducing the size of the measured IBB code also reduces risk of BtG verification failure. The smaller the footprint, the less exposure. Just make sure that the measured IBB code can handle verifying the PostIbb code. Remember, ACM failing to verify measured IBB code results in an unbreakable platform shutdown with no chance for BIOS to execute. On the other hand, IBB verification failure of PostIbb code allows the measured IBB code to take corrective action.

### Specifying the Source for IBB Segments

You have several options.

The tool can derive IBB segments automatically from BIOS using one of two methods:

* **FIT Table Type 7 Records** – When using this method, the IBB set consists of *measured segments* being the set specified by FIT Type 7 records and there will be no *Post IBB* segments. This mandates Option-A. Note: FIT Type 7 records were used by previous TXT implementations on Server Platforms to specify the Start-up BIOS code that would be validated to trust BIOS to scrub memory.
* **BIOS Info Table** – this is the same table that the FitGen tool uses to generate the FIT. The BIOS developer needs to set the attribute fields in that table as follows:

BIOS Info Table provides a list of modules, module type, and modules attributes. We are only interested in *Module Type == FIT\_TABLE\_TYPE\_BIOS\_MODULE*. Module attributes are defined as follows:

* Bits 0-3 are general and apply to all record types
  + Bit 0 is defined as “*Exclude from FIT*”
  + Bit 1-3 reserved
* Bits 4-7 are type specific. For *BIOS Module* type they are interpreted as follows:
  + Bit 4: Include as a “*Post IBB*” segment
  + Bit 5: Exclude from *ColdBoot Set*
  + Bit 6: Exclude from *S3-Resume Set*
  + Bit 7: (reserved for future)

So, for IBB Cold Boot Set, using BIOS Info Table, set attributes to 0x00 for Measured IBB segments, and to 0x10 for PostIbb segments. Setting will be slightly different for other set types.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Bit 4 | Bit 5 | Bit 6 | Include in  Cold Boot Set | Include in  S3 Resume Set |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | As Measured | As Measured |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | As non-measured | As non-measured |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | x | As Measured |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | x | As non-measured |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | As Measured | x |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | As non-measured | x |
| x | 1 | 1 | x | x |

FYI:

* Attributes ==0 equates to the module being included in the FIT and in all sets as a measured segment
* The *PostIBB* bit determines if the module will be included as a measured or a Post IBB segment
* Setting either *ExcludeFromFIT* or *PostIBB* results in the module being excluded from the FIT (using the FitGen tool).
* Setting *ExcludeFromCB* and/or *ExcludeFromS3* bits excludes the module from being included in that respective set.

Also note: For legacy TXT, the BIOS ACM and portions of the FIT was required to be covered by a FIT Type 7 record. For Intel BTG/TXT, they are not. Thus, those modules should have the *ExcludeFromCB* (and *ExcludeFromS3*) bit set. But don’t worry, if they are included, the BpmGen2 tool will modify the segments to exclude those areas, even if it has to split a segment into two or more segments.

## DMA Protection

You can instruct the startup ACM to setup DMA protection for the BIOS.

This is one area where Client platforms (including some entry level servers and low end workstations) differ slightly from Server platforms (including high end desktops and workstations that use server processors).

### Client Model:

Platforms based on client processors and chipset use the VT-d engine to protect the BIOS. To have the ACM setup DMA protection you need to do the following:

* Set the ***Enable DMA Protection*** bit in IBB Set: ***Flags***
* Specify the IBB Set: ***MCHBAR*** and ***VTD\_BAR*** addresses that the ACM is to program the exclusion registers.
* Specify the address range to be protected in IBB Set: ***DmaProtBase0*** and ***DmaProtLimit0***
* If desired, specify a second address range to be protected in ***DmaProtBase1*** and ***DmaProtLimit1***, otherwise set them to 0 if not used.

if you do not desire the ACM to set up DMA protection then clear the ***Enable DMA Protection*** bit in IBB Set: ***Flags*** and set all base/limit values to 0.

### Server Model:

Server platforms (which support multi-socket configurations and thus have multiple DMA engines) instead use General Protection (GenProt) Registers. To have the ACM setup DMA protection you need to do the following:

* Set the ***Enable DMA Protection*** bit in IBB Set: ***Flags***
* Specify the address range to be protected in IBB Set: ***DmaProtBase0*** and ***DmaProtLimit0***
* If desired, specify a second address range to be protected in ***DmaProtBase1*** and ***DmaProtLimit1***, otherwise set both to 0 if not needed.

If you desire not to have the ACM to set up DMA protection then set all base/limit values to 0.

# Power Down Memory Depletion

Memory scrubbing is an Intel TXT requirement which provides mitigation against reset attacks. A reset attack is when an agent forces a platform reset before the OS has had a chance to scrub its secrets from memory in hopes of gaining access to those secrets.

Historically, Client platforms differ from Server platforms in how memory gets scrubbed but with converged BtG/TXT, the client model is converging with server model where the ACM needs to rely on BIOS to scrub the memory. But BIOS must be trusted to do that. But what happens if BIOS verification fails? There are two backup methods that the ACM can fall back on. One is to enter an unbreakable shutdown and another is to turn off the platform power long enough for memory content to be depleted.

Currently, servers don’t support the Power Down Memory Depletion method (because Server TXT requires Btg Profile 4 or 5, which mandate unbreakable shutdown if BIOS integrity verification fails.

On client platforms, the ACM is capable of turning off the platform for a specified amount of time to assure there are no secrets remaining in memory after a surprise reset or when requested by BIOS (e.g., BIOS memory scrubbing fails).

The OEM provides information via the BPM that the ACM needs since the ACM executes before BIOS. The ACM must be able to:

* Read the current time from the Real Time Clock (RTC)
* Determine if there was an RTC power failure (access to PWRM)
* Program the RTC Alarm
* Put the platform into S5 state (for this you need to specify TXT\_ELEMENT. AcpiBase and TXT\_ELEMENT. PwrmBase).
* Store a “*Ref Time*” value so ACM can determine if the platform powered off long enough

There needs to be two bytes in the RTC CMOS memory that the ACM can use. You specify which bytes via TXT\_ELEMENT. PttCmosOffset0 and TXT\_ELEMENT. PttCmosOffset1. They do not need to be contiguous, but must be in bank 0 since other banks might not be accessible after platform reset.

Additionally, you control the length of time the platform must remain off. If you set TXT\_ELEMENT.PdUseDefault to TRUE, then the ACM will use a time that Intel has determined is sufficient for all memory types (approximately 10 minutes). Newer memory tends to deplete much faster, so if you know what the depletion time is for the memory that you support, then you can set TXT\_ELEMENT.PdUseDefault to FALSE and set the time via TXT\_ELEMENT.PdMinutes and TXT\_ELEMENT.PdSeconds. This could significantly reduce the time the platform is unavailable after a surprise reset.

## Invoking PDMS after a Surprise Reset

The BPM TXT Element contains 2 policy settings that impact the memory scrubbing process.

TXT\_ELEMENT.Flags.BackupPolicy specifies which backup method the ACM invokes when Backup action is needed:

00b – Default – Servers use unbreakable shutdown and clients use Power Down Memory Depletion

01b – Use Power Down Memory Depletion

10b – Use unbreakable shutdown

TXT\_ELEMENT.Flags.MemoryScrubbingPolicy controls when the ACM invokes the *Backup* method after a surprise reset (which is considered a potential Reset Attack).

00b – if BIOS IBB integrity (as per ColdBoot set) does not verify, then the ACM will use the *“Backup”* method. If it does verify, the ACM lets the BIOS scrub memory.

01b – ACM doesn’t use the *“Backup”* method (unless requested by BIOS). The ACM will always trust the BIOS to scrub the memory. Use this setting if your platform lacks the resources to support *Power Down Memory Depletion*.

10b – The ACM always uses the *“Backup”* method to scrub memory after a surprise reset. Thus BIOS will never be invoked until after the sequence completes and the ACM has cleared the Secrets flag.

## On Demand Power Down Memory Depletion

Client ACMs allow the BIOS to request the *Power Down Memory Depletion* process. This requires a non-volatile location (3 bits) that the ACM can read and write. The BIOS writes to this location to request the process and then resets the platform. On each reset, the ACM inspects that location and, if BIOS had set a PD request value, the ACM invokes the process. When the process completes, the ACM resets the request by clearing those 3 bits. Refer to the BIOS spec for the value the BIOS writes to invoke the process.

The BIOS may use an RTC CMOS location or a TPM NV Index. The PLATFORM\_CONFIG\_ELEMENT provides the information the ACM needs to access the *PD Request Location*. Note that when using a TPM NV Index, the Index data must be able to be read and written by both BIOS and by the ACM. Thus the index attributes must allow anyone to read/write. The SGX index satisfies this requirement, but you may use any NV Index that meets the access requirements.

# Boot from Block

Some devices, such as cell phones and tablets don’t have a BIOS flash device mapped into processor memory space, but rather use a block media device that contains the BIOS image that gets loaded into the processor memory map. These platforms have additional requirements and require that the BPM be built to meet those requirements.

The BpmGen2 tool allows you to build an initial BIOS image that could be used for both block and non-block boot.

Some of the requirements are:

* For non-block boot mode:
  + Do not specify –BLOCK on the BpnGen2 command line
  + IBB Entry point must be in an IBB segment above 4GB-64KB and is entered in real mode. That code transitions to protected mode.
  + Thus at least one segment must be above 4GB-64KB.
  + Entry point is specified by a line in the BPM Params file.
* For block boot mode:
  + Specify –BLOCK on the BpnGen2 command line (and optionally a Top Swap size).
  + IBB segments must be contiguous (or have very little space between them)
  + IBB segments must be located below 4GB-256KB
  + Thus IBB Entry point for block boot mode must be in a segment located below 4GB-256KB and is entered in protected mode.
  + Entry point is located by a GUID:

0x50626249, 0x456D, 0x746E, 0x72, 0x79, 0x50, 0x6F, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x74, 0x00

* + BpmGen2 tool prepends Boot Partition Descriptor Tables to beginning of modified BIOS file the tool generates.
  + Top Swap works differently for Block than it does when booting from SPI Flash devices.

For non-block boot, Top Swap region is typically between 128KB and 1MB. For Block Boot mod, the Top Swap size must cover the all of the critical code, which includes the FIT, ACM, FIT patches, KM, BPM, and IBB. Since a typical IBB is currently about 3MB, Top Swap size is much larger and the BIOS update process is different.

By specifying the *–BLOCK* parameter on the command line, the BpmGen2 tool builds a BPM for booting from a block device.



Figure BPM Processing with -BLOCK option

When building the BPM without the –BLOCK directive, the tool lists all IBB segments in the BPM. However when processing with the –BLOCK directive, the tool will omit any IBB segments above 4GB-265K. The tool also constructs Boot Partition Descriptor Tables (BPDTs) and pre-pends then to the BIOS file. The BPDT tells the ME/SPS firmware where to find the critical components so they can be loaded into processor memory before the BtG ACM executes to verify their validity.

Additionally, the tool will search the IBB segments for the Protected Mode IBB Entry Point GUID and set the IBB Entry Point in the BPM to the location immediately following the GUID.




# OBB Hash

Verification of the OBB is BIOS responsibility, but we have added a couple of options to the BpmGen2 tool to aid in that task. Just set the appropriate values in the BPM Params file. Here are your options:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | When there is no need to verify/authenticate OBB, just set *OBB Hash Algorithm* to "**0x10:NULL**". All other OBB settings will be ignored. |
|  | You don’t want to use the BPM. For example you had placed the OBB measurement in an IBB segment and use that to verify OBB. Or perhaps the OBB parts are signed and you verify the public key against a value in the IBB. Since IBB was verified, you can trust hashes and keys you placed in the IBB. For this case just set *OBB Hash Algorithm* to "**0x10:NULL**". |
|  | You calculate OBB hash using you own process and provide the BpmGen2 tool with the hash value. In this case you set *OBB Hash Algorithm* (see below) and set *OBB Source* to “**FILE**”, and specify the *OBB Hash Filename*. |
|  | When OBB encompasses everything from the start of the supplied BIOS file until the first IBB segment, then you can have the tool calculate the digest by setting *OBB Hash Algorithm* (see below) and setting *OBB Source* to “**BIOS image to first IBB segment**”. |
|  | When OBB encompasses everything from the start of an included FV file until the first IBB segment, then you can have the tool calculate the digest by setting *OBB Hash Algorithm* (see below), setting *OBB Source* to “**Start From Fv File to first IBB segment**” and setting the first ObbGuid line to be the GUID of that Fv File. In this case, the tool will locate the file by its GUID and calculate the hash from the first byte of the file data until the first IB segment. |
|  | When OBB encompasses a set of Fv files, then you can have the tool calculate the digest by setting *OBB Hash Algorithm* (see below), setting *OBB Source* to “**List of File GUIDs**” and supplying a number of ObbGuid lines (one for each Fv File that is to be included) specifying the GUID for a file that is to be included. The tool will calculate a composite hash for all those files (just the file data and not the file headers). |
|  | Values for *OBB Hash Alg* are:   * "0x10:NULL" * "0x04:SHA1" * "0x0B:SHA256" * "0x0C:SHA384" * "0x0D:SHA512" * "0x12:SM3"   The tool only acts on the value before the “:” so the text after the “:” is just for your information  For *OBB Source* the tool only acts on the first character (case insensitive). |

1. BpmGen2GUI Tool

The *BPMGen2GUI* tool is a Windows based application designed to generate the *BPM Params* file needed for the *BpmGen2* tool. It is also capable of generating a *Key Manifest*. It has its own User guide. You don’t have to use the *BPMGen2GUI* tool, but it is designed to make it easier for you to create the *BPM Params* file and to generate a *Key Manifest*.


   

1. Recommendations


This section will discuss “Best Known Practices” (BKMs) and other suggestions on how you can use the BpmGen2 tools. This is an informative section to help you understand various ways you may use the tool.

* 1. Verbose Output and Redirection


Since the tool is designed to be executed inside a batch file, by default it generates the minimum amount of screen output.



You can reduce the amount of screen output by redirecting the tool’s output to a log file. Note that warnings and errors are still displayed on the screen. For example, adding **“ > temp.log**” to the end of the command line displays:



and spools the rest of the text to the log file (in this case named *temp.log*). You can display or edit the log file:



You also have the option of changing the verbosity level to display (or log) more information by including **–V:1** or **–v:2** on the command line. Must be before the redirection option.

Using **-v:1** also displays:

* Tool progress like parsing the BPM Params file, BPM generation steps, verification steps
* FIT Table from the input BIOS file
* BPM
* KM
* Public Key hash digest values

Using **-v:2** displays everything displayed with –v:1 plus:

* BPM Params settings
* Additional processing steps & details
* BPM binary
* Final FIT Table (modified with new BPM and KM sizes)

When everything works fine, you probably don’t find the extended output very useful. But it can be very helpful when you are debugging your BtG implementation. So consider adding **“ –v:2 > temp.log**” to the command line. You can easily ignore the log file until you need it.

* 1. Master and Subordinate Keys

The key that you use the sign the KM is for all purposes a master key that is used to authorize other keys (in particular, the key used to sign the BPM). It is highly advised that you use a different key to sign the Key Manifest than used for signing the BPM.

For your company’s integrity sake, only a few individuals should have access to the KM private signing key. On the other hand, multiple people might need access to the BPM private signing key – especially during debug and testing phases.

You should consider using a different BPM key each platform that uses a different BIOS. For example, all server platforms use one key while workstations and client platforms use a different key. You will need to generate a KM for each of those BPM keys, each with a different KMID.

It is recommended that new BPM signing keys be used for each new generation of platform – i.e., platforms that are not compatible with the previous BIOS. This would also be a good time to use a new KM signing key to minimize the impact in case the KM Key gets compromised.

Remember, you must program the KMID and the hash of the KM public signing key into the platform’s FPFs during production of the platform. Also see B.2 “Development vs. Production” for using keys in the preproduction (debug and test) environment.

* 1. Development vs. Production

Typically, signing keys are restricted and there is a formal process for their authorized use. That is, the private key is guarded by a signing server, such that individuals do not have direct access to the private key, but rather must follow a strict procedure to have the server sign a binary.

During the development and testing phases, BIOS might be built many times and having to go through a formal process of signing the BPM might be time consuming. So during the initial debug and testing phases, it might be advantageous to allow the BIOS team to sign BPMs more easily than for the final release.

Let’s define a *Pre-Production* platform as a platform that does not have the *End of Manufacturing* (EOM) fuse blown. Until the EOM is blown, all *Field Programmable Fuses* (FPFs) values are read from memory on each boot and thus can easily be changed by the BIOS developer allowing each BIOS team to create their own “Debug” BPM signing key. This key is not a security concern if it only works on pre-production platforms. This can be accomplished by using a different KMID during the pre-production testing stages than for released (production) BIOS. Therefore, the first time a platform boots with a production BIOS, the EOM fuse is blown, and thus only a KM with the production KMID and signed with the production signing key (i.e., matches the key hash permanently programmed into the FPFs) can be used.

Hopefully you see where this is going. Only after BIOS is stable, for example the validation phases with a release candidate, does the BIOS need to be built with the actual KM and BPM signed with restricted keys.

An additional safeguard is to use the KMSVN and BPMSVN to prevent a Debug BIOS from ever being used on a production platform. Here is how it works.

* Create a Debug signing key – you can use the BpmGen2GUI tool to generate signing keys
* Create a Debug KM with KMID=0xFF authorizing the Debug BPM signing key
* Create a production KM with KMID = 1 authorizing the restricted BPM signing key

This lets BIOS developers use the BpmGen2’s internal signing capability for Debug BIOS builds and then use the BpmGen2’s external signing capability to sign the BPMs for production candidates. This requires each BIOS team to have 2 Bpm Parameter files such as Debug.bpDef that specifies the Debug signing key and Production.bpDef for Production that specifies external signing batch file. They also have 2 KMs, a Debug KM, signed with the Debug key using the debug KMID (say 0xFF) and the production KM with the actual KMID officially signed authorizing the production BPM signing key.

An additional trick is to use the KMRevocation value and BpmRevocation value to further protect against inadvertent use of a Debug signed KM or BPM. Use KmSVN = 0 to build the Debug KM, set the BpmSVN = 0 in the Debug.bpDef file (for debug signed BPMs) and use KmSVN = 1 (or more) in the Production KM and set BpmSvn=1 (or more) in the Prodcution.bpDef file.

Thus even if a debug signed KM and/or BPM were to get out, it could never be used on a production platform because anyone of the following would be detected as an invalid manifest.

1. KMID does not match FPFs
2. KM public signing key does not match FPFs
3. KM SVN (0) revoked
4. BPM is not signed with the key specified in a valid KM
5. BPMSVN (0) revoked
   1. Use of Manufacture’s Data Element

The purpose of this element was to allow you (the OEM) to include your own information, such as a hash digest, in the BPM and thus have it protected by the BPM signature. There are no restrictions on the content (except size), just specify a filename and the BpmGen2 tool will build the PM Element.

However, it will increase the size of the BPM. So, not only do you need to allocate enough space for the larger BPM (FIT Type 0xc record), but also be aware that some implementations (such as platforms that boot from a block device) have limitations on the maximum size of some components.

Some food for thought. You might use this element to provide the BIOS with a list of hash measurements of other files or modulus not otherwise covered. Or perhaps authorize a signing key for third party supplied files or modules.

* 1. Multiple Keys in Key Manifest

The primary purpose of the KM is to authorize a key for signing the BPM. But it can also be used to authorize keys for other purposes. In many cases the same key can be used for multiple purposes while other usages require unique keys.

The KM authorizes a key by specifying the hash digest of the public signing key and specifying the purpose (use) of that key. Thus the KM provides a list of public key digests where each key hash has a bit field indicating the authorized use for that key.

At least one (and one one) key must have the BPM bit set. Setting the same usage bit in multiple keys is not expected and might result in non-deterministic behavior.

The following key usage bits have been defined at this time – the rest are reserved:

1. BPM – signing BPM
2. FPM – signing a Fit Patch Manifest
3. ACMM – signing the ACM Manifest
4. SDEV – Signing SDEV

If you don’t know what some of these are, then you do not need to specify them.

* 1. Revoking Keys and Manifests

The BtG architecture provides for Anti-Rollback mechanism for the ACM, KM, and BPM. Some reasons why you might need to revoke a manifest include:

* A key authorized by the previous KM was compromised
* Changing the person/organization that was authorized by the previous KM
* The content of a previous manifest was wrong or created a security concern
* Old manifest was signed with a weaker key type, key size, or signing scheme

In any case, you want to prevent a previously signed BPM or KM from being used.

Note: if your KM signing key gets compromised, there is not much you can do for current platforms. That is why it is recommended that you use a different KM signing key for each project and guard KM signing keys with highest security.

Let’s take an example where you are using FIT Type 7 records to generate the IBB segments and now discover that the FIT type 7 records did not cover the entire IBB and thus left a vulnerability. This means that all BPMs that you produced to date, and thus all BIOS previous revisions, have a security flaw and you need to prevent their use.

So you build the new BIOS image, with a correct FIT, and edit the production BPM Params file to increment the BPMSVN value (let’s say from 2 to 3). You build the new BIOS and provide the BIOS update to your customers. As soon as they update the BIOS and the platform successfully boots, the BtG ACM detects the new BPM SVN level and causes the chipset BPMSVN fuses allowing SVN 0, 1, and 2 to be irrevocably blown. If anyone attempts to roll back the BIOS to a previous version where BPMSVN is less than 3, then the BPM will not verify and BIOS will not be allowed to execute.

Let’s take another scenario where the KM needs to be revoked because the BPM signing key ware changed and you want to invalidate that key. You would create a new production KM specifying the new BPM key and increment KMSVN. Once the BIOS update with the new KM successfully boots on the customer’s platform, the BtG ACM detects the new KM SVN level and causes the chipset KMSVN fuses to be irrevocably blown. If anyone attempts to roll back the BIOS to a previous version where KMSVN is less than the new value, then the KM will not verify and BIOS will not be allowed to execute.

Caution – there are only 15 levels of rollback protection for each manifest. So use them wisely.

* 1. KM Tutorial

If this is your first Intel BtG capable platform or you are just evaluating Intel BtG, then consider doing the following:

Crate a set of Debug signing keys and a Debug KM (using KMID 15)

Create a set of Production signing keys and a Production KM (Using KMID 1)

* + 1. Creating Debug KM

1. Using the BpmGen2GUI tool - create a Sample signing keys for KM and BPM
   1. Tools menu 🡪 Generate a Signing Key 🡪RSA
   2. Private Key Filename = DebugKmPrivateKey.pem
   3. Private Key Filename = DebugKmPubKey.pem
   4. Click the GENERATE button
   5. Private Key Filename = DebugBpmPrivateKey.pem
   6. Private Key Filename = DebugBpmPubKey.pem
   7. Click the GENERATE button
2. Use either the BpmGen2GUI tool or the BpmGen2 tool to create the Key Manifest   
   Note that at the time this is being written, the BpmGen2GUI tools has not yet been updated for the most recent changes. If this is still the case, then you will need to use the BpmGen2 tool. Let’s look at both ways
   1. To use the BpmGen2 tool
      1. Open a DOS Command Prompt and navigate to your working directory where you placed the signing keys
      2. Execute the following command:

BpmGen2 KMGEN –KM DebugKM.bin –SIGNKEY DebugKmPrivateKey.pem –KEY DebugBpmPubKey.pem –KMID 15 –KMSVN 0

This creates the KM named “DebugKM.bin” in your working directory

* 1. To use the BpmGen2GUI tool
     1. Start the BpmGen2GUI application,
     2. Click ***Create Key Manifest (KM)***
     3. Set KMID to 15
     4. Set KMSVN to 0
     5. For ***Key(s) being Authorized***
        1. Click on ***ADD***
        2. Click ***Browse*** and select DebugBpmPubKey.pem
        3. For ***USAGE*** check ***BPM***
     6. For ***KM Public Key***
        1. Click ***Browse*** and select DebugKmPubKey.pem
     7. For ***KM Private Key***
        1. Click ***Browse*** and select DebugKmPrivateKey.pem
     8. Click the ***GENERATE*** button and specify DebugKM.bin.

This creates a signed KM named “DebugKM.bin” in your working directory

* + 1. Typically you will want to save the KM Definition file, so:
       1. Click File🡪SaveAs
       2. Specify a filename such as DebugKM.kmDef

1. Provide DebugKM.bin, MyBpmPrivateKey.pem and MyBpmPubKey.pem to the BIOS developer for generating pre-production BIOS for testing.
   * 1. Creating Production KM

The KM authority is anyone authorized to sign a KM (such as a platform manager or production manager) and the BPM Authority is anyone authorized to sign a BPM (such as the BIOS Manager).

1. A KM authority creates a signing key using his/her signing server and gets the public key. Let’s name this ProdKmPubKey.pem.
2. A BPM authority creates a signing key using his/her signing server and gets the public key. Let’s name this ProdBpmPubKey.pem.
3. Create a batch file that will be able to take the KM body (Km2BeSigned.bin) and produce a signature saving that signature to Sig.bin. Let’s name this XSign.bat.
4. Use either the BpmGen2GUI tool or the BpmGen2 tool to create the Key Manifest
   1. To use the BpmGen2 tool
      1. Open a DOS Command Prompt and navigate to your working directory where you placed the public signing keys
      2. Execute the following command:

BpmGen2 KMGEN –KM ProdKM.bin –XSIGN Km2BeSigned.bin XSign.bat Sig.bin –SIGNPUBKEY ProdKmPubKey.pem ­­‑KEY ProdBpmPubKey.pem –KMID 1 –KMSVN 1

This creates the KM named “ProdKM.bin” in your working directory

* 1. To use the BpmGen2GUI tool
     1. Start the BpmGen2GUI application,
     2. Click ***Create Key Manifest (KM)***
     3. Set KMID to 1
     4. Set KMSVN to 1
     5. For ***Key(s) being Authorized***
        1. Click on ***ADD***
        2. Click ***Browse*** and select ProdBpmPubKey.pem
        3. For ***USAGE*** check ***BPM***
     6. For ***KM Public Key***
        1. Click ***Browse*** and select ProdKmPubKey.pem
     7. For ***KM Private Key***
        1. Click ***Browse*** and select ProdKmPrivateKey.pem
     8. Click the ***GENERATE*** button

This creates a signed KM named “ProdKM.bin” in your working directory

* + 1. Typically you will want to save the KM Definition file, so
       1. Click File🡪SaveAs
       2. Specify a filename such as prodKM.kmDef

1. Provide the signed KM to the BIOS Developer to be included in the production BIOS

As a final note, you most likely want to prepend a platform name to all of your filenames. Especially if you intend to use different signing keys for each generation. For example, if your platform name was Skyline, then you would be producing SkylineProdKM.bin using SkylineProdPubKey.pem.

* 1. BPM Tutorial

Keeping in line with the KM Tutorial, you will want to build multiple BPM Parameter files:

* Debug.bpDef for use during the debug and testing phases
* Prod.bpDef for use during testing of Production Candidates
* Release.bpDef for building the BPM (and BIOS) that gets shipped

Again, you most likely want to prepend a platform name to all of your filenames. For example, if your platform name was Skyline, then you would be producing SkylineDebug.bpDef, SkylineProd.bpDef, and SkylineRelease.bpDef.

1. Start with the sample bpDef, make the changes to suit you platform and rename it Debug.bpDef
   1. BpmRevision: 0
   2. BpmRevocation: 0
   3. BpmSigSource: Internal
   4. BpmSigPubKey: DebugBpmPubKey.pem
   5. BpmSigPrivKey: DebugBpmPrivateKey.pem

Note that BpmRevision is for your own use. Consider incrementing this value every time you make a change to the bpDef file.

1. To generate the BPM, execute the following in a script file or from a DOS prompt:

BpmGen2 GEN MyBios.rom Debug.bpDef –U MyUpdatedBios.rom –KM DebugKM.bin

1. Once you have debugged your BIOS and corrected Debug.bpDef, then you are ready to transition to testing a production candidate with the production signed KM.
   1. Make a copy or Debug.bpDef named Prod.bpDef.
   2. Xxx
2. BpmParams File

A typical BPM Parameter file (\*.bpDef) is shown below.

# FILEHEADER

FileID: \_BPMDEF\_

FileVersion: 1

ToolVersion: 2

ToolDate: 20161108

// Internally signed RSA 2048 / SHA256 {reminder of what this Def file represents}

# BPM\_DEF

PlatformRules: ICX Server

BpmStrutVersion: 0x20

BpmRevAutoInc: FALSE

BpmRevision: 1

BpmRevocation: 0

AcmRevocation: 0

NEMPages: 0x40

IbbSetCount: 1

CurrentIbbSet: 0

//

# IBB\_SET

IbbSetType: 0:ColdBoot

IbbSetInclude: TRUE

PBETValue: 0x0f

MCHBAR: 0x00000000FED10000

VTD\_BAR: 0x00000000FED90000

//DMA Protection

DmaProtBase0: 0xFFFE0000

DmaProtLimit0: 0xFFFF0000

DmaProtBase1: 0x0

DmaProtLimit1: 0x0

IbbFlags: 0x0

// Bit0 : Enable DMA Protection;

// Bit1 : Issue TPM Start-up from Locality 3;

// Bit2 : Extend Authority Measurements into the Authority PCR;

// Bit3 : On error: Leave TPM Hierarchies enabled. Cap all PCRs.;

IbbHashAlgID: 0x0B:SHA256

IbbEntry: 0xFFFFFFF0

PostIbbHashAlgID: 0x0B:SHA256

PostIBBHashSource: Calculate

PostIbbHashFile: PostIbbDigest.hash

IbbSegSource: BIOS INFO

IbbSegFile:

IbbGuid: 4a4ca1c6-871c-45bb-8801-6910a7aa5807

# MINOR\_VERSION\_ADDITIONS: 1

DmaProtAutoCalc: TRUE

//

// The following illustrates that:

// (1) Tool supports multiple IBB Sets

// (2) The DEF file can contain optional sections that get excluded from the BPM

# IBB\_SET

IbbSetType: 1:S3Resume

IbbSetInclude: FALSE

PBETValue: 0x0f

MCHBAR: 0x00000000FED10000

VTD\_BAR: 0x00000000FED90000

//DMA Protection

DmaProtBase0: 0

DmaProtLimit0: 0

DmaProtBase1: 0

DmaProtLimit1: 0

IbbFlags: 0

// Bit0 : Enable DMA Protection;

// Bit1 : Issue TPM Start-up from Locality 3;

// Bit2 : Extend Authority Measurements into the Authority PCR;

// Bit3 : On error: Leave TPM Hierarchies enabled. Cap all PCRs.;

IbbHashAlgID: 0x0B:SHA256

IbbEntry: 0xFFFFFFF0

PostIbbHashAlgID: 0x10:NULL

PostIBBHashSource: File

PostIbbHashFile: PostIbbDigest.hash

IbbSegSource: BIOS INFO

IbbSegFile:

IbbGuid: 4a4ca1c6-871c-45bb-8801-6910a7aa5807

# MINOR\_VERSION\_ADDITIONS: 1

DmaProtAutoCalc: TRUE

//

# TXT\_ELEMENT

TxtInclude: TRUE

TxtFlags: 0x0

// [4:0] = TXT execution profile

// 00000b – Use Default based on HW

// 00001b - Server Profile

// 00010b - Client Profile

// [6:5] = “Memory scrubbing” policy

// 00b - Trust Verified BIOS

// 01b - Trust Any BIOS

// 10b - Trust No BIOS

// [31] = Reset AUX control (1=AUX Reset leaf will delete AUX Index)

//MemoryDepletion Power Down

AcpiBase: 0x400

PwrmBase: 0xFE000000

PdUseDefault: TRUE

PdMinutes: 5

PdSeconds: 10

PttCmosOffset0: 0x7E

PttCmosOffset1: 0x7F

//TXTE Segments

TxtSegSource: IBB

TxtSegGuid: 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000

TxtSegHashAlgID: 0x10:NULL

//

# PLATFORM\_CONFIG\_ELEMENT

PdReqLocation: TPM

// Power down request location for CMOS

CmosIndexRegister: 0x70

CmosDataRegister: 0x71

CmosIndexOffset: 253

CmosBitFieldWidth: 3

CmosBitFieldPosition: 0

// Power down request location for TPM1.2

# TPM1.2\_LOCATION

TpmIndexHandle: 0x50000004

TpmByteOffset: 7

TpmBitFieldWidth: 3

TpmBitFieldPosition: 0

// Power down request location for TPM2.0

# TPM2.0\_LOCATION

TpmIndexHandle: 0x01C10104

TpmByteOffset: 7

TpmBitFieldWidth: 3

TpmBitFieldPosition: 0

// Power down request location for PTT

# PTT\_LOCATION

TpmIndexHandle: 0x01C10104

TpmByteOffset: 7

TpmBitFieldWidth: 3

TpmBitFieldPosition: 0

//

# PLATFORM\_MANUFACTURERS\_ELEMENT

PmdeInclude: FALSE

PmdeFile:

//

# BPM\_SIGNATURE

BpmSigSource: Internal

BpmSigHashAlgID: 0x0B:SHA256

BpmSigKeyType: 0x01:RSA

BpmSigScheme: 0x14:RSASSA

BpmKeySizeBits: 2048

BpmSigPubKey: SamplePublicKeyRsa2048.pem

BpmSigPrivKey: SamplePrivateKeyRsa2048.pem

BpmSigBatch: ExampleExternalSigning.bat

BpmSigData: Bpm2Sign.bin

BpmSigXSig: X-SignedBpm.bin

//

#EOF